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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
This appeal is from the district court's granting of 
summary judgment in favor of defendant insurance 
company, First Mercury Syndicate, Inc. The issue before us 
is whether dismissed employees, who brought underlying 
wrongful discharge actions, are "insureds" within the 
meaning of a policy provision which excludes coverage for 
actions brought by "insureds against insureds." We 
conclude that the ex-employees are not "insureds" within 
the meaning of the policy exclusion. We will, therefore, 
reverse and remand this case to the district court to enter 
judgment in favor of the Township of Center and Township 





On January 4, 1993, the Township dismissed three 
employees. These former employees filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, on December 10, 1993, against the 
Township, Schweinsberg and Oesterling. Schweinsberg and 
Oesterling were duly elected township supervisors and were 
serving in their capacities of elected supervisors at the time 
the dismissed employees filed the underlying lawsuits. The 
former employees alleged that their discharge violated their 
constitutional rights and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act and that it was a result of a common law 
conspiracy. One of the former employees also filed suit in 
state court, on January 13, 1993, alleging that he was 
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wrongfully discharged from employment in violation of state 
law. 
 
At the time the employees were discharged, First Mercury 
was Township's errors and omissions insurer and provided 
the Township with its public officials' liability insurance 
policies. The relevant contracts of insurance have the 
effective date and policy periods of March 24, 1992, 
through March 23, 1993, and March 24, 1993, through 
March 23, 1994. Under the policies, the Township was the 
named insured. Schweinsberg and Oesterling were also 
"insureds." The relevant provisions of both policies are 
identical. 
 
Township notified First Mercury of the wrongful 
discharge actions in a timely fashion and demanded 
defense and indemnity coverage under the policies. First 
Mercury issued a denial letter, declining to defend or 
indemnify the Township, Schweinsberg or Oesterling. In 
taking this position, First Mercury relied on Exclusion V of 
the policy, which excludes claims made by insureds against 
other insureds. The Township then brought this declaratory 
judgment action to determine coverage. The parties brought 
cross motions for summary judgment. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of First Mercury, 
declaring that First Mercury had no duty to defend or 
indemnify the Township or its supervisors in the underlying 




The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 by reason of diversity of citizenship. We have 
jurisdiction of the district court's final order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We "exercise[ ] plenary review of the district 
court's decisions resolving cross-motions for summary 
judgment." United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, Local Union No. 430, 55 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 
1995). Summary judgment is only appropriate when, after 
consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material fact 
remains in dispute and the moving party is entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this 
appeal, the parties agree that there is no factual dispute. 
Rather, the question is whether the district court correctly 
interpreted the provisions of the contract. A district court's 
conclusion as to the legal operation of an insurance policy 
is a question of law subject to plenary review. Dickler v. 
CIGNA Property & Casualty Co., 957 F.2d 1088, 1094 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
The primary issue in this action is whether the "insured 
v. insured" exclusion should prevent coverage of a wrongful 
discharge action even though, when the claim was made, 
the discharged employees were no longer employed by the 
Township. The policy language relevant to the scope of 
coverage is as follows: 
 
A. [I]f, during the "policy period," any "claim" or 
"claims" are first made against the "Insured" 
individually or collectively, for a "wrongful act," 
[First Mercury] will pay, on behalf of the"Insured," 
all "loss" which the "Insured" shall become legally 
obligated to pay as "damages" in accordance with 
the terms of this policy . . . . 
 
The policy contains the following exclusionary language: 
 
WE SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO MAKE ANY PAYMENT 
FOR "LOSS" IN CONNECTION WITH ANY "CLAIM" OR 
"CLAIMS" MADE AGAINST THE "INSURED" BASED 
UPON OR ATTRIBUTABLE TO: 
 
V. Any claims by the "governmental entity" against an 
"insured" or claims by an "insured" against another 
"insured." 
 
First Mercury contends that the ex-employee/plaintiff's 
in the underlying actions are "insureds" within the meaning 
of the "insured v. insured exclusion." Therefore, because 
the underlying suits were brought by insureds, discharged 
employees, against other insureds, the Township and the 
supervisors, First Mercury argues that Exclusion V 
precludes coverage. 
 
"Insureds" is defined in the policies as follows: 
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A. [A]ll persons acting within the scope of their official 
duties who were, now are or shall be lawfully 
elected or lawfully appointed officials and members 
of the "Governmental Entity" 
 
It is the Township's position that the Plaintiffs in the 
underlying actions are not insureds within the policy 
definition because at the time the claims were made they 
were no longer employees of the Township.2  
 
Under Pennsylvania law, exclusions from an insurance 
policy must be clearly worded and conspicuously displayed. 
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Furthermore, the policy must unequivocally indicate 
coverage or non-coverage. Lucker Manufacturing v. Home 
Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 814 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Hartford 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moorhead, 396 Pa. Super. 234, 578 A.2d 
492, 503 (1990)). The district court determined that the 
"insured v. insured" exclusion was unambiguous, "explicitly 
exclud[ing] coverage for claims brought by `insureds' 
against other `insureds,' " and defining" `insureds' to 
include elected and appointed officials as well as 
employees." The court also decided that the relevant time 
period for determining the applicability of the exclusionary 
clause was the point when the alleged wrongful acts of the 
Township defendants occurred, not when the claims 
against them were made. Thus, the court concluded, 
because the ex-employee/plaintiffs were "employees" at the 
time of the alleged wrongful acts, they were "insureds" 
within the meaning of the policy and excluded from 
coverage. We must decide whether the status of "insureds" 
under the contract is determined at the time the claims 
were made or at the time of the alleged wrongful acts. 
 
The policies in question are "claims made" policies. The 
policies state: 
 
EXCEPT TO SUCH EXTENT AS MAY OTHERWISE BE 
PROVIDED HEREIN, THE COVERAGE OF THIS 
POLICY IS LIMITED TO LIABILITY FOR ONLY THOSE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The appellants further argue that the First Mercury contracts are 
riddled with ambiguities. In view of our decision to reverse the judgment 
of the district court, we do not need to address the ambiguity issue. 
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"CLAIMS" THAT ARE FIRST MADE AGAINST THE 
INSURED AND REPORTED TO THE COMPANY WHILE 
THE POLICY IS IN FORCE. 
 
A "claims made" policy, as opposed to an "occurrence" 
policy, protects the policy holder against claims made 
during the life of the policy, rather than against 
"occurrences" which happen during the policy period and 
for which claims may arise later. Bolden v. Niagra Fire Ins. 
Co., 814 F. Supp. 444 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Therefore, a "claims 
made" policy provides coverage for a wrongful act 
regardless of when it took place, as long as a claim is made 
during the relevant policy period.3 
 
Both the district court and First Mercury rely on City of 
Harrisburg v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Inc., 596 
F. Supp. 954, 959 (M.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd mem. 770 F.2d 
1067 (3d Cir. 1985), to support the proposition that for 
both "claims made" and "occurrence" policies, the relevant 
time for determining a person's status as an insured is 
when the alleged wrongful conduct took place, not when 
the claim is made. In City of Harrisburg, the district court 
held that the mayor of Harrisburg was not covered under a 
public officials' liability policy because, at the time of the 
mayor's allegedly wrongful conduct, he was the mayor-elect 
and had no official public duties or responsibilities. 
Therefore, the court concluded, he was not yet a public 
official or employee of Harrisburg and consequently not an 
"insured" under the policy. 
 
We find City of Harrisburg to be distinguishable from the 
case at bar. In City of Harrisburg, the issue was whether 
the wrongful act was committed by a person covered by the 
policy. The policy defined wrongful act as "any actual or 
alleged error or misstatement or misleading statement or 
act of omission or neglect . . . by an insured, as a public 
official." The court interpreted this language to indicate that 
for coverage under the policy to be triggered, the wrongful 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that many claims-made policies include a provision negating 
or restricting coverage for events which occurred prior to the policy 
period. The instant policies, however, are "pure" claims-made policies, 
providing complete retroactive coverage save one minor exception not 
relevant to this case. 
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act must have been committed by a then-insured public 
official. In the case at bar, however, the crucial question is 
not whether the wrongful act was committed by a 
"then-insured" official. The issue here is whether it is 
determinative for coverage that the person, who suffered 
the injury from the alleged wrongful act, was also covered 
by the policy at the time of the wrongful act. 
 
We conclude, because the policy here is a "claims made" 
policy, that the determination of the status of the injured 
party in the "insured v. insured" context must be made as 
of the time that the claim is made. This result is consistent 
with the language of the policy. Under the policy, First 
Mercury was liable for any claims made during the policy 
period for wrongful acts which occurred even before it was 
on the risk. Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether the 
Township or the plaintiffs were insureds of First Mercury at 
the time of the wrongful act. The focus is whether the 
plaintiffs were insureds at the time the claim was made. 
This conclusion is supported by the purpose behind claims- 
made policies, which, as previously noted, is to insure 
against a claim, rather than against an occurrence. 
 
This conclusion finds further support in the policy 
underlying the "insured v. insured" exclusion. The primary 
focus of the exclusion is to prevent collusive suits in which 
an insured company might seek to force its insurer to pay 
for the poor business decisions of its officers or managers. 
The exclusion arose from a wave of litigation in the mid- 
1980's when corporations attempted to use their Director 
and Officer policies to recoup operational losses. BARRY R. 
OSTRAGER, THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 20.02(g) at 778 (7th ed. 1994). Where, 
however, it is clear that the underlying action is not 
collusive, the exclusion has not precluded coverage. See, 
e.g., Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Zandstra, 756 
F. Supp. 429, 432 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Conklin, Inc. v. Nat'l 
Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 4-86-680, 1987 WL 108957, at *6 
(D. Minn. Jan. 28, 1987) (the endorsement is not designed 
to exclude wrongful discharge suits, but rather is "intended 
to prevent collusive or friendly lawsuits, where, for example, 
the insured company sues its directors or officers for their 
wrongful acts"); American Cas. Co. v. FDIC , No. 86-4018, 
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1990 WL 66505, at *41 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 1990) (the 
purpose "intended to be served by the insured v. insured 
exclusion" is to exclude coverage for "internecine warfare 
and collusive suits among officers and directors"). Thus, 
because the focus is on the nature of the underlying suit, 
the relevant time period for determining the status of the 
insured for purposes of the exclusion should be when the 
claim is made. 
 
Here, there is no contention that the underlying actions 
are collusive. Moreover, the discharged employees are not 
seeking coverage under the policy. When the underlying 
actions were brought against the Township, and hence by 
the time the claims were made, the plaintiffs were no longer 
employed by it. It is difficult to imagine a circumstance, 
short of a conspiracy to defraud, in which a wrongful 
discharge suit, brought by a former employee, could be 
perceived as constituting a collusive act. We conclude, 
therefore, that under the facts of this case the ex- 
employees/plaintiffs are not insureds within the meaning of 




Because none of the ex-employee/plaintiffs in the 
underlying action were employed by the Township at time 
the claims were made, First Mercury's "insured v. insured" 
exclusion does not apply. The district court's judgment in 
favor of First Mercury is reversed, its order dated April 15, 
1996, is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district 
court to grant judgment in favor of the Township of Center 
and the Township Supervisors, Dean E. Schweinsberg and 
Debra Oesterling. Costs are to be taxed against appellee. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In coming to this conclusion, we do not intend in any way to modify 
the definitions of "insured" which appear in the policy provisions other 
than in the "insured v. insured" exclusion. 
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